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The Prospects for Regulatory Reform:
The Legacy of Reagan's First Term
Michael Fixt
George C. Eadstt
Four years ago, when the Reagan Administration was about to embark
on its first term in office, it announced that "regulatory relief" would be a
cornerstone of its economic program.' The Administration spoke of elimi-
nating hundreds of obsolete and inefficient regulations,2 revising major
regulatory statutes like the Clean Air Act,' and even abolishing several
regulatory agencies.4 As Reagan's second term begins, regulatory issues
are no longer so prominent. The words "regulatory relief" are no longer
heard. Indeed, the only politically realistic prospects for statutory change
involve strengthening, not weakening, major social regulatory statutes.
And the only regulatory agency abolished has been the Civil Aeronautics
Board, a victim of legislation passed during the Carter presidency.'
It would be a mistake, however, to consider the Reagan Administra-
tion's regulatory activities during its first term a failure. The Administra-
tion has surely left its mark on regulation. And in some areas-like presi-
dential control over the rulemaking process-its changes are likely to be
permanent. Nevertheless, the Administration did not achieve many of its
stated objectives. Perhaps more importantly, prospects for achieving some
of these objectives are less favorable now than when the Administration
first took office-due, in some part, to the way it has handled regulatory
activities, particularly during its first two and a half years.
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1. See, e.g., D. Stockman, Avoiding a GOP Economic Dunkirk (1980) (arguing that regulatory
relief is necessary to avoid a "quantum scale-up of the much discussed regulatory burden") (un-
paginated memorandum on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
2. See, e.g., id..
3. See, e.g., id..
4. See generally Deregulation HQ: An Interview on the New Executive Order with Murray L.
Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 14.
5. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40, 92 Stat. 1705, 1744 (1978)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1982)).
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As the Administration begins its second term, it seems appropriate to
examine the regulatory legacy of the first four Reagan years. Section I of
this Article describes the proposals for regulatory reform that were com-
peting for support at the end of the Carter presidency. Section II analyzes
the Administration's regulatory efforts during its first term and draws on
this analysis to speculate about what reforms are politically possible in the
second term. Section III focuses on the second-term prospects for regula-
tory change in four major areas that tell us something about the legacy of
regulatory relief: the expanded use of market mechanisms; the devolution
of regulatory authority to the states; the White House regulatory oversight
function; and the revision of major aspirational statutes. The Article con-
cludes by noting that absent significant legislative change, the legacy of the
Reagan regulatory program will be an expansion of administrative discre-
tion and presidential control over social regulation. Ironically, this will
leave future presidents better equipped to reconstruct the regulatory edi-
fice Ronald Reagan once promised to dismantle.
I. The Emerging Consensus in the Late 1970's for Regulatory Reform
By the end of the Carter Administration, a consensus had emerged
among many economists and policymakers that economic and social regu-
lation was overly expensive, inflexible, arbitrary, and ineffective. Although
many disagreed over what should be done, recognition of the need for
reform cut across party lines and traditional political affiliations. Many
policymakers believed that the economic costs of regulation were excessive.
This sentiment was bolstered by Murray Weidenbaum's estimate that the
current regulatory policy was costing $100 billion a year." Other estimates
of the costs attributable to specific regulatory rules and of the costs in-
curred by specific sectors of the economy also supported this contention."
The EPA, for example, estimated the cumulative cost of achieving clean
6. Weidenbaum, On Estimating Regulatory Costs, REGULATION, May-June 1978, at 14 (costs of
regulation in 1979 "may top $100 billion").
7. See, e.g., Portney, The Macroeconomic Impacts of Federal Environmental Regulation in, THE
MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 25, 30 (H. Peskin, P.
Portney, A. Kneese eds. 1982).
Virtually all analysts offering cost estimates conceded that they had not attempted to measure the
social benefits of regulation and offset those benefits against estimated regulatory costs. See, e.g., M.
WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFINA, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 3
(1978)(American Enterprise Institute Reprint No. 88). Indeed, studies failed to show that regulation
was a significant factor affecting the conventional indicators of economic performance-inflation, pro-
duction, economic growth and unemployment. See, e.g., E. DENISON, ACCOUNTING FOR SLOWER ECO-
NOMIC GROWTH 122-44 (1979). But these facts did not lessen the impact cost estimates had on regula-
tory policy.
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air and water alone would total more than $360 billion between 1977 and
1986.8
Policymakers also noted that regulatory institutions tended to be highly
inflexible and arbitrary, imposing costly inefficiencies on affected busi-
nesses.9 Bardach and Kagan argued that regulators adopted strict, legalis-
tic enforcement approaches to avoid the criticism and political pressure
which accompany even the appearance of undue leniency.' 0 They demon-
strated that rigid adherence to rules left inspection routines insensitive to
the unique characteristics of businesses and industries. Other critics ob-
served that command and control regimes contributed to the system's arbi-
trariness and inflexibility. They argued that such, regimes relied too heav-
ily on highly prescriptive design standards and on detailed, inflexible rules
that failed to account for diversity among regulated entities and created
the impression of arbitrary patterns of enforcement. 1 ' The volume of in-
formation disclosure and paperwork required for regulatory compliance
was also criticized.'
2
Perhaps the most damning criticism offered was that many regulatory
schemes were simply not effective. This criticism focused on the lack of
evidence of success by regulatory agencies. For example, although studies
found that automobile accidents per mile traveled were decreasing, critics
noted that the studies also showed that this trend predated the founding of
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 3 Similarly, Lave
and Omenn attributed the major portion of improvements in air quality
during the 1970's to the switch from coal to oil in electric power genera-
tion rather than to standards issued under the Clean Air Act." Not sur-
prisingly, such studies were controversial and were criticized for failing to
consider what might have occurred in the absence of federal standards.
Some commentators went so far as to argue that regulation was per se
8. ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE COST OF CLEAN AIR
AND WATER, S. Doc. NO. 38, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979) (figures presented in 1977 dollars).
9. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONA-
BLENESS 105 (1982).
10. Id. at 207-08.
11. See, e.g., Kahn, Regulation and the Imagination, in INNOVATIVE TECHNIQUES IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 1, 5-7 (1980) (Proceedings of a Regulatory Council Conference).
12. As Charles Schultze stated in his Godkin lectures at Harvard University: "The more compli-
cated and extensive the social intervention, the more difficult it becomes to accumulate the necessary
information at a central level. It is relatively easy to set up a system for payroll records from which to
determine social security benefits .. " In contrast, "an efficient regulatory scheme to control the
discharge of pollution into the nation's waterways requires that regulatory authorities know the pro-
duction function, the range of technologies for pollution control and the demand curve of every major
polluter." C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 20 (19.77).
13. S. PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF AUTOMOBILE SAFETY 24 (1975). But see Graham & Garber,
Evaluating the Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 3 J. PUB. ANAL. MGMT. 206 (1984).
14. L. LAVE & G. OMENN, CLEARING THE AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1 (1981).
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an unwise form of social control.15 Others asserted that regulators lacked
the ability to control more than a minute fraction of the billions of indi-
vidual decisions made daily concerning health and safety." These critics
argued that market mechanisms, such as product liability laws and insur-
ance, might be more effective means to influence social behavior.'
7
The above-mentioned critiques, taken together, represented a forceful
indictment of regulatory excesses. Each of Ronald Reagan's three prede-
cessors had tried to bring these excesses of regulation under control.' 8 The
legacy of those efforts-the broadest of which was advanced by the Carter
Administration'-was the emergence of a rough consensus both inside
government and among academic critics on the proper underlying princi-
ples for regulatory reform.
This consensus reflected a belief that individual reforms should be neu-
tral in character and application, and should not be dictated by political
expediency. It also included a recognition that, although reform did not
require expanding the scale of regulatory institutions, it did require
strengthening their capabilities. Moreover, most advocates of reform
agreed deregulation was appropriate in traditional areas of economic reg-
ulation, but inappropriate in areas of social regulation. They believed that
the inevitable market imperfections in areas into which regulation had
been introduced in the 1960's and 1970's required that such regulation be
made more efficient rather than eliminated." Regulatory reform was also
15. See, e.g., Reynolds, A Free Market in Energy, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION 67 (R. Poole, ed.
1982); Meiners, What to do About Hazardous Products, in id. at 285.
16. See, e.g., L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 2-3 (1981).
17. See, e.g., G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO
PRODUCT LIABILITY AND PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION 120-38 (1984).
18. See, e.g., G. EADS & M. FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? 45-68 (1984).
19. The Carter Administration attempted to reduce administrative expenses and compliance costs
and to improve regulatory coherence by strengthening the power of the President to oversee regulatory
activity. The Carter efforts included the creation of an explicit presidential oversight role through the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3520) (1982), and the creation of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group as an expert regulatory
"watchdog." The Administration also created the Regulatory Council to help develop and encourage
the use of more cost-effective forms of regulation. The Council later prepared an agenda of regulatory
reform proposals which stressed: (1) enhancement of presidential oversight; (2) institutionalization of
cost-benefit regulatory assessment procedures; (3) adoption of flexible regulatory alternatives and mar-
ket mechanisms in lieu of traditional command and control regulation; and (4) further examination of
non-governmental solutions (such as greater insurance availability) to problems previously viewed as
primarily regulatory in character. See generally U.S. REGULATORY COUNCIL, REGULATORY REFORM
HIGHLIGHTS 1970-80: SUMMARY AND FINDINGS 1-5 (1980).
20. The term social regulation has over the past few years been applied to the set of federal
programs that use regulatory techniques to achieve broad social goals-a cleaner environment, safer
and more healthful workplaces, safer and more effective consumer products, and equal employment
opportunities. (The term protective regulation is also used to refer to these programs.) See, e.g., Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (establishing EPA). Most pro-
grams of social regulation originated in the 1960's and 1970's, although some-the programs of the
Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture-go back several decades. See,
e.g., Act of Oct. 31, 1949, ch. 792, § 401, 63 Stat. 1054 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1421-49
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considered to be a slow, incremental process. Because regulators and regu-
lated entities had substantial sunk costs in existing regulatory regimes, the
constituency supporting reform was small and politically unstable. It was
therefore seen as crucial that the reforms proceed in a careful manner, so
that public support would not be undermined.
II. The Regulatory Relief Efforts of the Reagan Administration During
Its First Term
The regulatory relief program implemented by the Reagan Administra-
tion was based upon an entirely different set of premises from those un-
derlying the earlier consensus. These premises were grounded in the liber-
tarian view that most economic and social regulation was an unwarranted
intrusion of the federal government into private decision-making. The
1982 Economic Report of the President clearly articulated this position:
Many government programs, such as detailed safety regulations or
the provision of specific goods (rather than money) to the poor, are
best described as paternalistic. Paternalism occurs when the govern-
ment is reluctant to let individuals make decisions for themselves and
seeks to protect them from the possible bad effects of their own deci-
sions by outlawing certain actions. Paternalism has the effect of dis-
allowing certain preferences or actions. . . . There is no reason to
think that commands from government can do a better job of increas-
ing an individual's economic welfare than the individual can by
making choices himself. Moreover, the long-term costs of paternal-
ism may be to destroy an individual's ability to make decisions for
himself."'
Advocates of this perspective sought a wholesale repeal of economic and
social regulatory regimes. The recent success of deregulatory efforts in ar-
eas of economic regulation was interpreted as indicating that deregulation
in areas of social regulation was also feasible and desirable. Hence, the
goal of regulatory relief was not to reform social regulation, but to elimi-
(1982)) (establishing price supports for agricultural commodities).
An important distinguishing feature of social regulation (especially to economists) is that one cannot
expect even properly functioning markets to produce the goals that social regulation seeks. As far as
economists are concerned, the problems of environmental pollution, excessive levels of workplace
hazards, or unsafe consumer products exist largely because "commodities" like environmental quality,
workplace safety, and product safety do not trade in markets. Economists work hard to devise ways to
simulate markets for such "commodities," arguing that if this could be done, the goals of social regula-
tion could be achieved at far less cost and with far less government interference in the details of
business decision-making. But even the most optimistic of the economists' schemes contemplate some
continued federal regulatory presence.
21. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 42 (1982).
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nate it, thereby removing impediments to economic growth and to the pro-
motion of personal responsibility.
The new Administration originally accorded regulatory relief a place on
its agenda equal to that given budget, tax, and monetary policy. The
Reagan regulatory program was implemented much more quickly than
the regulatory reform measures of previous administrations. It was based
upon a theory of economic decisionmaking that places great weight on the
value of "shocking" and was intended to "shock" regulatory expectations
downward.22 This objective is articulated in David Stockman's "Dunkirk"
memo, which called for a "dramatic substantial rescission of the regula-
tory burden for the short-term cash flow relief it will provide to business
firms and the long-term signal it will provide for corporate investment
planners." 3
The Reagan regulatory relief program consisted of three principal
strategies. First, dozens of pending and existing administrative regulations
would be delayed, rescinded, or revised. Second, agency enforcement poli-
cies and practices were to be altered to make the regulatory process more
cooperative and less combative. Third, the federal regulatory bureaucracy
was to be harnessed by strengthening presidential oversight of the regula-
tory process, by limiting the discretion of federal regulators, and by trans-
ferring their responsibilities to the states.
A. Strengthening Presidential Oversight
The centerpiece of regulatory relief was Executive Order 12,291,4
which centralized regulatory oversight within the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget
and called for the promulgation of a uniform cost-benefit standard that all
regulations would be required to meet to ". . . the extent permitted by
law." '25 In some respects the Order represented an extension of efforts
22. The Reagan Administration's economic game plan relied heavily on an immediate "expecta-
tions" shock - and on reaping its reward. Applying this approach to regulatory relief, it becomes
immediately clear that the actual timing of any relief that might be forthcoming would have less
impact on business decisions than the secure knowledge that relief would in fact occur. See, e.g., G.
EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 42 (1984).
23. D. Stockman, supra note 1.
24. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
25. Id. at 128. In several respects, the Reagan program represented a departure from past policy.
First, it effectively shifted the burden of demonstrating that proposed regulations were cost effective
from the White House to the agencies. Second, although it preserved requirements for regulatory
impact analyses for "major" regulations (i.e., those having an impact estimated at more than $100
million), it vested far greater discretion in the White House to designate as "major" regulations not
meeting the dollar requirement and to exempt from analysis others that did. Third, for the first time
cost-benefit analyses of regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies were made mandatory
- except where prohibited by law. Fourth, where regulatory reviews had previously been distributed
among several executive branch offices and departments (such as the Regulatory Analysis Review
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taken during the Carter Administration to enhance the President's role in
overseeing the regulatory process. Indeed, on its face the order did not
constitute a major departure from Executive Order 12,044, promulgated
during the Carter years.2  The differences lay elsewhere-in practice and
in the two administrations' underlying philosophies.
The Reagan order as implemented was criticized immediately for its
lack of openness and questionable legitimacy. 7 By not requiring that
OMB disclose comments made to agencies regarding changes in proposed
or existing rules, the order converted OMB's role in the regulatory review
process into an analogue of its behind-the-scenes efforts to prepare the
federal budget. Critics pointed out, however, that while the President's
budget is reviewed and revised by the Congress, federal regulations do not
benefit from debate in a comparably democratic forum. 8
Imprudent comments by OMB officials,29 continuing criticism regard-
ing OMB officials' vulnerability to ex parte and unrecorded contacts with
regulated entities, and the small and diminishing resources of OIRA
raised serious doubts about the possible neutrality of the new OMB re-
view process." These concerns eventually began to stimulate reform pro-
posals. For example, a key provision of Congressman Sam Hall's generic
regulatory reform bill would have expressly prohibited the director of
Group and the Council on Wage and Price Stability), Executive Order 12,291 concentrated those
functions within OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Fifth, the process
established by the Executive Order provided officers at OIRA not one, but two occasions for reviewing
proposed regulations: their adequacy was reviewed before their promulgation in both proposed and
final forms and OIRA was given the power to order delay of publication of contested rules while
differences with the relevant agency were ironed out. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES WHICH MAY BE RAISED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291, at 12-13 (Comm. Print 1981) [herein-
after cited as PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL].
26. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).
27. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL, supra note 25, at 60.
28. Id. at 54.
29. One of the most widely reported statements along these lines was made by Boyden Gray,
Counsel to the Vice President, in a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Gray told his audience
to bring their problems with regulatory agencies to his attention. Gray reiterated his willingness to
smooth out regulatory problems in an appearance before a House Subcommittee, declaring: "If you
have a problem, if you think that they [the agency] are not recognizing and paying attention to the
material that you give them, bring the material to me and or to us and we will see then what the
problem is." Role of OMB in Regulation, 1981: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1981).
30. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE HOUSE ENERGY AND
COMMERCE COMM., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIV-
ILEGE OVER EPA DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM AND OTHER MATTERS 282-94
(Comm. Print 1984). The report observed that the OMB had at times "served as a conduit for af-
fected industries by allowing the industries to comment directly to OMB on draft proposed rules and
then passing the industry comments along to EPA as OMB's own." Id. at 292. Four Republicans on
the 13 member committee dissented from the report. Id. at 295.
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OMB from participating in "any way in deciding what regulatory action,
if any, the agency will take in any rule-making proceeding."'"
B. Constraining Agency Discretion
The Administration made three major managerial changes during the
first term: steep budget cuts, agency reorganizations, and the appointment
of ideologically uniform administrators. A number of regulatory agencies
had their budgets reduced between fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1984.32
Hardest hit were agencies regulating the environment, land use, and con-
sumer affairs, and agencies administering traditional economic regula-
tion." A series of reorganizations also affected agency staffing and capac-
ity. For example, proposed changes at the Federal Trade Commission34
and at the Office of Surface Mining" led to an exodus of seasoned en-
forcement staff and to a concentration of agency authority and activities in
Washington instead of at agency regional offices. Repeated reorganiza-
tions of the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement Division also
left that critical agency office in disarray. 6 Finally, many of the Reagan
Administration's early appointments, particularly those at the sub-Cabinet
level, were characterized more by ideological uniformity than by relevant
administrative or political experience.3 7 Taken together, these strategies
seemed designed to constrain agency discretion and were widely perceived
as having reduced regulatory capabilities.
C. Transferring Regulatory Authority to the States
The third area in which the Administration attempted to leave an insti-
tutional imprint was the transfer of regulatory authority and responsibil-
ity to the states. The Administration expected the transfer to speed up the
regulatory process, broaden it to involve parties with the most complete
31. H.R. No. 2327, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 624(a) (1983).
32. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 151.
33. Id.
34. See Proposed Closing of Four FTC Regional Offices: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1982).
35. See Office of Surface Mining, Denver, Colorado: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
Service of the House Comm. on Post Office & Civil Service, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1982). The
Office of Surface Mining reorganization program led to a 49% attrition rate between January 1981
and June 1982 in the office's staffing in the GS-I to GS-15 civil service grades, only about half of
whom were replaced by the end of October 1982. Letter from Rep. Patricia Schroeder, Chairperson,
Subcomm. on Civil. Service, House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, to James Watt, Secretary
of the Interior (Oct. 28, 1982) (letter on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
36. J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON AMERICAN HEALTH 128
(1984).
37. Anne Gorsuch's appointment as Administrator of the EPA is one example. See N. Y. Times,
Feb. 20, 1981, at A23, col. 2.
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knowledge of regulatory impact, and increase its efficiency by enhancing
the flow of information between regulators and regulated entities. The
1982 Economic Report to the President demonstrates the Administration's
whole-hearted endorsement of this transfer of authority:
Regulation should take place at the appropriate level of government.
The primary economic reason for most regulation is the existence of
external effects. The costs or tolerance of these external effects may
vary among locations. Economic efficiency, therefore, calls for the de-
gree and type of regulation to vary also. National standards tend to
be too severe in some regions, while being too lax in others. Federal
regulations should be limited to situations where the actions in one
State have substantial external effects in other States, constitutional
rights are involved, or interstate commerce would be significantly
disrupted by differences in local regulations.8
Consistent with these premises, the pace of formal delegation of federal
regulatory responsibility to the states was quickened, 9 regulations gov-
erning the transfer of that authority were relaxed,4 and both the formal
and informal oversight of states activities by federal regulatory agencies
was reduced.4
The Administration's modus operandi in effecting the transfer, how-
ever, undercut political support. At the same time states were being called
on to assume a greater share of the national regulatory burden, the federal
government sharply reduced its funding for state programs. For example,
although new state obligations to control pollutants mounted between
1980 and 1984, EPA grants to support state environmental programs fell
in real terms by one-third.4 Moreover, budget restrictions hampered the
38. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 166.
39. For example, 27 state delegations of Phase I program authority under the Resources Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982), were completed during the first 24 months of the
Reagan Administration. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 214-15. Although prior efforts of the
Carter administration and program maturity are responsible for a significant proportion of these dele-
gations, it is clear that the Reagan administration has accelerated the rate at which formal delegations
such as these have proceeded. Id. at 220; see also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY 1982, at 10 (1982).
40. For instance, in October 1981 the Office of Surface Mining revised by rulemaking what is
termed the "State Window Rule" to relax requirements state programs would have to satisfy to be
eligible for program delegation. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1981) (codified as amended at 30 C.F.R. §§
730-732 (1984)).
41. An example is the Environmental Protection Agency's adoption of a revised review process, 47
Fed. Reg. 27,073 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52), which streamlined approvals of amend-
ments to State Implementation Plans (SIP) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982). From
January 1981 through October 1982, the number of SIP revisions pending dropped 97%, from 643 to
20. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 226.
42. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PROPOSALS FOR 1985, at 7 (1984). State obligations to control
pollutants are discussed at supra note 40.
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implementation of innovative regulatory techniques, such as emissions
trading, which relied heavily on state participation and required substan-
tial front-end expenditures.
Furthermore, the Administration's selective enthusiasm for regulatory
federalism called the neutrality of the strategy into question. The Admin-
istration's treatment of the regulation of hazardous workplaces provides a
good example. Within weeks after Reagan took office, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) withdrew a proposed federal
standard designed to provide information to employees about chemical
hazards in the workplace.' After the withdrawal, a number of states and
localities passed their own employee "right to know" statutes." However,
following complaints by affected companies over the stringent new state
and local regulatory regimes' and assertions that a uniform federal stan-
dard was needed,"' OSHA reentered the field promulgating new rules.
OSHA prohibited states from adopting regulations more stringent than it
had promulgated and from regulating industry categories not covered by
federal regulations.' 7 Federal preemption was complete.' 8
III. The Impact of the Administration's Approach on Future Efforts
for Regulatory Reform
At the end of its first term, the Reagan Administration was able to
claim a measure of success for its regulatory relief program. It had re-
duced the number of new regulations promulgated by the federal govern-
ment,' rescinded a number of regulations pending at the time of Reagan's
election,"0 and strengthened and expanded presidential oversight of the
regulatory process. 1 In some areas regulatory responsibility had been
shifted to the states,' 2 and some progress had been made in reducing regu-
latory costs.58 Productivity gains for business had been stimulated, al-
43. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,214 (1981) (withdrawing notice of proposed rulemaking setting forth pro-
posed standard requiring employers to identify hazardous chemicals in workplace).
44. See Foote, Beyond the Politics of Federalism: An Alternative Model, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 217,
221-22 & n.18 (1984).
45. See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget Control of OSHA Rulemaking: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982) (testimony of George H. R. Taylor, Director, Department of Occupational
Safety and Health, AFL-CIO) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
46. See, e.g., An OSHA Rule Industry Wants Despite the Cost, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 1983, at 47.
47. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1984)).
48. See Foote, supra note 44, at 222-24.
49. See, e.g., G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 166-67.
50. Id. at 168, 180.
51. See generally id. at 108-12.
52. See id. at 220.
53. See id. at 236-37.
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though not nearly to the extent claimed by the Administration. 4 The
Reagan Administration, however, had not achieved its broader goal of
rolling back social regulation permanently. Few enduring changes had
been made, and, by 1984, institutional and political support for broad reg-
ulatory reform had eroded. The generally unpromising atmosphere for so-
cial reform resulted from two early strategic miscalculations.
The first miscalculation occurred close to the outset of Reagan's first
term. The Administration imported into the arena of social regulation the
deregulatory strategies and rhetoric which had been previously employed
in the realm of economic regulation. 6 The result was a set of strategies
which led to a deterioration of institutional capacity in many regulatory
agencies. Between 1980 and 1984, federal agencies responsible for regu-
lating the environment, land use, and consumer protection were subjected
to reductions in staff and budget on the same scale as a number of inde-
pendent agencies which were being phased out of existence by statute."
This reduced strength made it virtually impossible for many agencies to
carry out their unchanged statutory missions. Viewed as neglecting their
legal obligations, the agencies became vulnerable to criticism from the
press, the Congress, and the public. Reduced capacity also left rule
changes vulnerable to legal challenge, since diminished resources made it
difficult for agencies to provide the analytic support required to justify
proposed shifts in agency rules.
The second miscalculation was the Administration's apparent indiffer-
ence to the need for neutrality in regulatory procedures and outcomes.
Critics condemned highly discretionary enforcement strategies, oversight
procedures which remained shielded from public view, and delegation
strategies that appeared indifferent to state and local capability. 7 These
critics suspected that the lessened adversarial enforcement approaches, in-
54. See Christiansen & Haveman, The Reagan Administration's Regulatory Relief Effort: A
Mid-term Assessment, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 49, 69-70, 78-79
(G. Eads & M. Fix eds. 1984) [hereinafter cited as REGULATORY STRATEGY).
55. Rhetorically, Administration spokesmen were reported to advocate the dramatic, wholesale
revision of major social regulatory statutes. For example, in December 1983, Christopher DeMuth,
then head of OIRA, reportedly called for the development of a second-term regulatory agenda which
would "replace the Clean Air and Water Acts and related environmental laws with laws that empha-
size economic incentives rather than mandatory federal standards." C. DeMuth, Regulatory Policy 8
(Dec. 9, 1983) (unpublished memorandum on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
56. After accounting for inflation, the percentage decreases in budget authority of the EPA, the
Office of Surface Mining, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission between 1980 and 1984
were about as drastic as those experienced by the Civil Aeronautics Board. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra
note 18, at 152-53.
57. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 45, at 10 (1982) (statement of George H. R. Taylor, Director,
Department of Occupational Safety and Health, AFL-CIO); see also PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL, supra
note 25, at 7.
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creased centralization, and accelerated delegation were simply attempts to
bring about de facto deregulation.
Near the end of Reagan's first term, the Administration seemed to lose
its interest in regulatory relief. The Administration had suffered a major
public relations debacle at EPA. Moreover, the political divisions between
proponents of regulatory restraint and regulatory activism deepened, with
the debate over social regulation taking on a moral tone. 8 With an elec-
tion approaching, Administration rhetoric became conciliatory,59 aban-
doning the bellicose anti-regulation threats heard in the Republican Plat-
form of August 1980.60 Regulatory change moved very much off the
center of the political stage.
The change was not merely one of style. A set of controversial appoin-
tees were replaced,6" and, at least for the moment, agency budget cuts
slowed. Indeed, at the most politically visible regulatory
agency-EPA-previous budget cuts were reversed with the assent of the
Office of Management and Budget.6" Even the language of regulatory
change was altered. The term "regulatory relief" was no longer operative,
having been replaced by its more traditional forerunner, "regulatory
reform."6
Did this mean that a chastened and wiser Reagan Administration was
ready to return to the path charted by the Ford and Carter administra-
tions? Certainly, by the end of its first term, the Administration appeared
to be moving away from the political rhetoric of regulatory relief towards
a more traditional if subdued policy of regulatory reform. At least in the
short run, however, the charged political environment the Administration
had created by the end of its first term was a serious impediment to such
reform in the second term.
58. The tenor of regulatory debate that was taking place towards the end of the first Reagan term
is reflected, in part, by the titles of the literature then emerging on the Reagan social regulatory effort.
Among the most widely noted were: S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH
TO DEREGULATE (1983); J. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1984); J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT
FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON AMERICAN HEALTH (1984).
59. See Green, Reagan: The Liberal Democrat, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1984, at A23, col. 5.
60. "The Republican Party declares war on government overregulation. We pledge to cut down
on federal paperwork, cut out excessive regulation, and cut back on the bloated bureaucracy." 126
CONG. REC. 20,625 (1980).
61. See Stansfield, Ruckelshaus and Clark Seek to Blunt Environmental Lobby's Political Swords,
NAT'L J., June 30, 1984, at 1256.
62. See Mosher, Ruckelshaus's First Mark on EPA- Another $165.5 Million for Its Budget,
NAT'L J., June 25, 1983, at 1344.
63. See, e.g., DeMuth, A Strategy for Regulatory Reform, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 25.
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IV. The Prospects for Regulatory Reform in the Second Term: Four
Crucial Areas
As the Reagan Administration begins its second term, prospects for
sweeping regulatory change appear dim, though not universally bleak.
This Section identifies three areas of reform in which the Reagan Admin-
istration has endorsed change and significant progress is possible: (1) the
development and adoption of market-oriented regulatory innovations, (2)
the transfer of regulatory authority to the states, and (3) increased presi-
dential oversight of the regulatory process. The section also examines the
possibility of obtaining statutory revision of "aspirational""' social legisla-
tion and makes clear that obtaining enduring regulatory reform requires a
higher level of political commitment, skill, and patience than has been
exhibited by the Administration's attempts at regulatory relief.
A. Market Oriented Regulatory Innovations
By the late 1970's, substantial attention had focused on market-oriented
regulatory techniques as a more flexible and efficient alternative to the
traditional command and control regimes. 6 It was believed that by decen-
tralizing decision-making and reducing the role of the federal government,
market-based alternatives would better account for the diversity of regu-
lated entities, reduce paperwork burdens, and conserve agency resources.
Reformers hoped that the new strategies would provide regulated firms
with a stronger incentive to comply with regulations, disclose information,
and reduce litigation.6"
Although market-based reforms were supposed to accomplish these sub-
64. See infra note 116.
65. The market-oriented alternatives to "command and control" regulatory techniques identified
by the Regulatory Council during the Carter Administration included the following:
1. MARKETABLE RIGHTS: the distribution of a limited number of rights to scarce re-
sources that private parties can then buy, sell or trade as market needs dictate.
2. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES: the use of fees or subsidies rather than government en-
forced standards to encourage private sector achievement of regulatory goals.
3. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: the replacement of regulations specifying the exact
means of compliance (usually detailed design standards) with general targets that the regulated
firms can decide how to meet.
4. COMPLIANCE REFORM: the replacement or supplementing of governmental moni-
toring and enforcement with market oriented mechanisms including third party compliance
monitoring, penalties that reflect the degree of non-compliance and supervised self certification.
5. INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: providing users of a product with relevant informa-
tion about the consequences of using it.
6. VOLUNTARY ACTIONS: reliance on regulatory standards developed by third parties
or the regulated firms themselves.
Supra note 1I, at v.
66. See generally R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (1983); Spence & Weitz-
man, Regulatory Strategies for Pollution Control in APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION
199 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978).
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stantial goals while illustrating the virtues of the marketplace, they re-
ceived surprisingly little attention during the first term of the Reagan
presidency. A review of the past year's activities, however, suggests that
such reforms may be at the forefront of the Administration's regulatory
agenda during the second term.
Since their inception, market-based regulatory mechanisms have en-
joyed a modest political constituency among academics, and state and fed-
eral bureaucrats. 7 Although support from these constituencies is impor-
tant, it only partially explains the favorable prospects for market-based
reforms during Reagan's second term. Of at least equal importance is the
prominence that such reforms have gained as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Chevron US.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil,68 which made clear that some of these reforms could be achieved ad-
ministratively, without the often elusive approval of Congress.
In Chevron, the Court upheld the authority of the EPA to implement
without legislative approval its market-based "bubble policy"69 in geo-
graphic areas which have not attained national air quality standards. The
bubble policy allows pollution-emitting devices or facilities regulated
under the Clean Air Act to set off less expensive pollution reductions at
one source against more costly emissions requirements at other sources, as
long as aggregate air quality is improv*ed. Emissions trades, including the
bubble policy upheld by the court, function as supplements to existing
agency rules and are administered within the framework established in
controlling legislation. Chevron did not disturb, and may indeed have re-
inforced, the agency's continuing practice of promulgating policies regard-
67. See, e.g., Drayton, Getting Smarter About Regulation, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1981, at
38.
68. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
The narrow question posed by Chevron was whether the agency's construction of the term "station-
ary source" under the Clean Air Act was at variance with Congressional intent. Under the interpreta-
tion advanced by the agency, use of the netting element of the agency emissions trading policy could
be extended to non-attainment areas and would no longer be limited to those areas of the country
found to be in compliance with federal air quality standards. Id. at 2780.
69. EPA's emissions trading policy, issued in 1982 and supplemented in 1983, sets forth four
related substantive reforms to comply with provisions of the Clean Air Act. The four consist of:
1. the bubble, which allows managers of one or more existing plants to trade additional
control of cheaply controlled stacks or vents for less control of more expensive sources;
2. offsets, which allow new plants or modifications to emit pollutants in non-attainment
areas if they secure sufficient reductions from others to improve air quality;
3. netting, which allows use of a bubble to avoid burdensome New Source requirements for
inplant modifications, so long as plant-wide emissions do not increase significantly; and
4. banking, which allows sources to store surplus reductions in a legally protected manner
for future use or sale.
M. Russell, Incentives to Strengthen Regulation of Pesticides: The Uses of Regulatory Reform, U. N.
ENVIRON. PROG. IND. & ENVIRON. NEWSLETTER, July-Sept. 1984, at 8, 9.
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ing the use of market mechanisms in the form of policy guidelines, rather
than by statute, or by regulation.
In the wake of Chevron, EPA intensified its efforts to expand trading
concepts to other programs. This effort was spurred by the appointment
of the reform-minded William Ruckelshaus as administrator of the
agency, 70 and encouraged by organizations and individuals often identified
as supporters of the Reagan Administration.7 The agency has extended
trading principles to new areas within the purview of the Clean Air Act,72
including mobile sources." Moreover, trading principles have also been
applied outside the air program, 74  and now cover areas such as the
amount of leaded gasoline refiners are allowed to produce.7
A review of the evolution of market mechanisms reveals that despite the
popularity trading principles now enjoy, adoption of market-based re-
forms remains a slow and complex process. Although the initial EPA ex-
perimentation has quieted much skepticism and solved some mechanical
problems, many of the problems encountered by the EPA will doubtless
resurface. Commentators have noted that when emissions trading was first
developed no real constituency for the, policy existed.7" Even within the
EPA, the air and water program staffs and the regional offices initially
70. William Ruckelshaus resigned as EPA administrator on November 30, 1984. Lee A. Thomas,
former chief of the agency's hazardous waste control programs, was named to replace him. N. Y.
Times, Nov. 30, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
71. See, e.g., Clark, The Environmental Protection Agency in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP 11 84
(1985). Clark writes:
Excessive costs also result when regulators use "command and control" regulations ... rather
than using regulatory systems that permit the flexibility that results from market systems.
Regulatory systems can introduce market flexibility by allowing manufacturers to exchange
cleanup obligations, so that firms that face a high cost to reduce a given increment of a pollu-
tant can contract with other firms to achieve the same level of cleanup at lower cost.
Id. at 84.
72. One example would be EPA's recent internal decision to allow new sources of air pollution to
use emission credits, trading, banking, or a bubble under the Clean Air Act in non-attainment areas
without a demonstrated attainment plan. See Aim Approves New Source Bubble Proposals, ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1468 (Jan. 11, 1985).
73. In October 1984, EPA proposed an averaging program for diesel particulate emissions from
heavy duty trucks. The program would allow some engines with emissions that are more difficult to
control to exceed the emission standard so long as the sales weighted total emissions level does not
exceed federal designated minimum standards. 49 Fed. Reg. 40,248 (1984) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 86).
74. The agency's Water Innovation Project is examining state experience with point source trades,
trades between point and non-point sources, as well as the use of banking strategies to control water
pollution. See EPA ANN. REG. REP. 7 (1983).
75. In November 1982, EPA introduced a policy of permitting lead trading among gasoline refin-
ers and importers. The agency's lead trading policy was extended through 1987 under a policy which
would encourage refiners and importers to take actions to reduce the lead content of the gasoline they
produce or sell earlier rather than later. See Extensions of Lead Trading Rights to 1987, ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1469 (Jan. 11, 1985).
76. See Levin, Getting There: Implementing the "Bubble" Policy, in SOCIAL REGULATION:
STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 59, 65 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan eds. 1982).
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resisted the program. Agency officials feared that the trading would be
unduly resource intensive and would distract from more pressing adminis-
trative functions.7 Almost eight years of institutional commitment of po-
litical capital and resources were required to overcome political resistance
to the policy. Led by the agency's regulatory reform staff, the process in-
volved selling emissions trading to the agency's central and regional office
bureaucracies, to national public interest groups, to industry, and to local
and state officials.
Some of the pioneering work done at the EPA will make future at-
tempts to implement market-based reforms easier. The agency's use of
economic incentives to entice states to assume program responsibilities is
one such innovation . 8 The agency's efforts to introduce regulatory negoti-
ation 9 and to reexamine environmental auditing may also prove useful.80
Nevertheless, rapid and easy progress is improbable because trading
principles tax the political, legal, and technical capacity of regulating enti-
ties in ways that are not susceptible to simple solutions. Indeed, a recent
survey indicates that although most state and regional air officials believed
that emissions trading is a good idea, the officials continue to experience
many problems. Unresolved issues and procedural requirements continue
to cause frustration in program implementation and significant delays. Fi-
nally, those surveyed often voiced dissatisfaction with the complexity of
the trading policy and expressed a need for more detailed guidance.81
The prospect of severe budget cuts at federal regulatory agencies also
poses a substantial threat to broader application of trading principles-at
least in the near term. Budget cuts could disrupt research and develop-
ment, and limit the scope of federal oversight and the amount of technical
assistance provided to state regulators. Given the complexity of the review
and enforcement process, and the incentives which polluters have to claim
unjustified credits, steep cuts could be disastrous.
77. Id. at 69-71, 78-79.
78. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 39,580 (1983).
79. The agency's regulatory negotiation project is exploring ways in which to develop regulations
by negotiation. The proposed regulations governing diesel emissions from heavy trucks (see Levin,
supra note 76) were worked out through an early experiment with the process. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
6, 1984, at A22, col. 1.
80. In the area of environmental auditing (the development of internal management systems for
reviewing facility operations to determine compliance with environmental regulations), the agency has
completed a large scale research effort on the use of auditing in agency enforcement activities. See
ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., CURRENT PRACTICES IN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING (1984) (report pre-
pared for EPA).
81. See JELLINEK, SCHWARTZ, CONNOLLY & FRESHMAN, INC., EMISSIONS TRADING IN SELECTED
EPA REGIONS (1984) (report prepared for EPA).
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B. Regulatory Federalism: Continued Delegation of Regulatory Au-
thority to the States
Although market-based regulatory mechanisms received scant attention
in the early years of the Administration's first term, the same cannot be
said of regulatory federalism. Almost from the day Carter left office, the
Reagan Administration vigorously pursued a policy of delegating regula-
tory authority to the states. Indeed, the Administration effected significant
transfers of authority during its first term82 and probably will continue to
do so. Moreover, these delegations are likely to be among the most endur-
ing of the Administration's regulatory actions.
It would be oversimplifying, however, to view regulatory federalism as
an irresistible force. In fact, devolution seemed to slow toward the end of
the first term as a somewhat more deliberate approach appeared to
emerge, perhaps reflecting political resistance to regulatory federalism.
During the past year, for example, EPA began a major review of state
programs operating under the Clean Water Act.8" Although second
thoughts about state regulatory authority appear more the exception than
the rule, it appears that regulatory federalism will be pursued with a
more considered accounting of political costs.
1. Factors Influencing Further Delegation
The pace, scope, and endurance of regulatory decentralization in the
second term are likely to be influenced by the availability of federal funds
to support the regulatory activities assumed by the states, the receptivity of
industry to strengthened state regulatory roles, and the opposition of state
and public interest groups to delegations of authority that appear to be
mere smokescreens for deregulation.
Rhetoric of the New Federalism campaign notwithstanding, when Ad-
ministration budget priorities have clashed with state preferences, state
interests have frequently been overridden. If this continues to be true, fur-
ther budget cuts could impede delegation of regulatory responsibilities to
the states. Severe cuts in federal funding of state environmental programs,
combined with strong fiscal pressures on state government, would dimin-
ish the prospect for future delegation of EPA authority. Funding cuts will
particularly chill delegation in spheres of expanding federal regulation,
such as federal pre-treatment programs created by the Clean Water Act.
In a recent letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, former EPA Administrator
Ruckelshaus stated that a tenfold increase in federal staffing would be
82. See supra note 39.
83. Ronald Reagan's Second-term Agenda, FORTUNE, Oct. 1, 1984, at 26, 30.
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required to implement the program. 4 Staff increases of similar scope are
expected to be necessary in the twenty-five states that have assumed au-
thority for administering the pre-treatment program.8" In the absence of
assured federal funding, it is unlikely that additional states will seek au-
thorization to administer their own program.
Industry can also act as a formidable check on the delegation of regula-
tory authority to the states, especially when regulatory authority is frag-
mented in a manner which imposes substantial costs on powerful indus-
tries. In business spheres where uniform federal standards promote
economies of scale, support for nationally administered regulatory pro-
grams, rather than state delegation, is dominant.8 In instances where-con-
flicts between state and business interests have arisen over delegation to
date, the Administration has shown a strong predilection to sacrifice its
oft-enunciated federalism principles and side with business.8"
When the delegation of federal regulatory responsibility appears to
cloak an effort by the Administration to abandon statutory responsibility,
opposition by the states themselves, as well as public interest groups, is a
further check on regulatory federalism. For example, attempts by the
Army Corps of Engineers to abandon responsibility for policing headwa-
ters and inland lakes88 have met with united and forceful opposition from
a group of state governments.89 Similarly, the National Wildlife Federa-
tion recently led a successful legal challenge to regulations issued by the
Office of Surface Mining that would have improperly delegated to states
the power to approve surface mining plans on federal lands.9"
84. Significant Increase in Staff Level Needed to Carry Out Pre-treatment Program, EPA Says,
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 534 (August 8, 1984).
85. Id.
86. See G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 230.
87. In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Comm., 457 U.S. 1132
(1983), the federal government joined the petitioners in arguing successfully that a California statute
authorizing a moratorium on nuclear power plant construction was preempted by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1982). In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615(1984), the Court rejected the government's argument and held that federal law did not preempt state
laws allowing punitive damages awards against companies which allowed their employees to become
contaminated with radiation.
Note also the Administration's preemption of state hazardous workplace rules. Hazard Communi-
cation, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5); see also G. EADS & M. FIX,
supra note 18, at 230-31 (describing willingness of federal government to preempt state law when
desirable).
88. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 33 C.F.R.).
89. See G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 223-24.
90. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1724 (D.D.C.
July 6, 1984).
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2. Why Delegation is Likely to Continue
As the above discussion indicates, the Administration obviously cannot
treat regulatory federalism as trouble-free. Additional delegation will re-
quire attention to political cost and expedience. Nonetheless, regulatory
devolution will continue during the second term and those delegations that
have already occurred will for the most part endure. These two facts can
be attributed to three characteristics of the delegation of regulatory power:
(1) it is supported by the delegatees; (2) it attracts little publicity; and (3)
it is consistent with the policies of prior administrations.
Delegation enjoys considerable political support among the delegatees.
State legislators and administrators consistently place a high value on pro-
gram autonomy.9" These officials recognize that heightened regulatory au-
tonomy provides them with greater influence over the context within
which trade-offs between regulatory protections and economic develop-
ments take place.9" They are also aware that state regulatory autonomy
gives them the opportunity to assume credit for successful regulatory pro-
grams. Although this makes it harder for them to shift blame for regula-
tory failures onto federal bureaucrats, state regulators generally prefer the
enhanced power and autonomy promised by regulatory federalism.9 3
Delegation also has the advantage of achieving reform through rela-
tively informal administrative channels that are removed from public at-
tention and media focus. With few exceptions, delegations completed to
date have generated little political controversy. Often, transfers of regula-
tory authority do not require agency rulemaking or even conformance
with the modest dictates of the Administrative Procedure Act.94 A compar-
atively small group of professionals structures the labyrinthine relations
between local, state and federal regulatory agencies.9 Such a concentrated
locus of policy-making power, to which outsiders have limited access, en-
ables allocative decisions to take place without significant public debate or
media attention. As a result, external political pressures sufficient to pro-
duce policy reversals will probably not be brought to bear on the Admin-
91. Fix, Transferring Federal Regulatory Authority to the States, in REGULATORY STRATEGY,
supra note 54, at 153, 163.
92. Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in REGULATORY STRATEGY, supra
note 54, at 111.
93. Id. at 122-27.
94. For example, regulatory authority is de facto transferred when federal oversight of state regu-
latory activity is diminished. See G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 211.
95. Obviously, this is a characteristic which delegation shares with emissions trading policy. See
generally E. Meidinger, The Politics of Market Mechanisms in U.S. Air Pollution Policy: On the
Emerging Culture of Regulation (March 1984) (paper presented at the Conference on Distributional
Conflicts in Environmental-Resource Policy, Berlin, West Germany).
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istration's movement toward regulatory decentralization with any ease or
frequency.
A third reason delegation should endure is that Reagan's transfer of
regulatory authority to lower levels of government represents an acceler-
ated continuation of policies put in place by previous administrations.
Regulatory federalism is not a radical break from past policy, or from the
principles upon which such policy rests. The policy of regulatory delega-
tion, like that of reliance on market mechanisms, is premised on political
and economic theories of greater maturity and broader currency than
those regulatory policies driven by the "supply-side" economics which the
Reagan Administration embraced. This foundation in accepted theory and
recent history should render regulatory federalism less vulnerable to at-
tack by academic and political critics.
C. Future Directions for White House Oversight
The beginning of Ronald Reagan's second term, like the beginning of
his first, witnessed the issuance of an executive order concerning regula-
tory oversight.9 The content of that second order, as well as the virtual
absence of controversy surrounding it, reveals a great deal about the likely
course of White House oversight of regulation during Reagan's second
term. The most recent order establishes, in effect, a regulatory budget
without numbers. It creates a process by which OMB, working with exec-
utive branch agencies, will develop and publish an administration regula-
tory program."' This program will reflect "the administration's regulatory
goals and objectives," 98 much as the President's annual financial budget
reflects his administration's economic goals and objectives.
In its most extreme form, the concept of a regulatory budget is closely
analogous to that of a financial budget. Costs and benefits would be esti-
mated in dollar terms for all proposed regulations. Through a process
akin to that employed in putting together a financial budget, agencies
would be allotted ceilings representing the total regulatory costs they
would be permitted to impose on the economy. Once these ceilings were
set, the precise details of how regulations were written and imposed would
be left to the agencies. OMB's work would be done.99
The idea of a regulatory budget-with or without numbers-is not
new. While many economists viewed the increased use of cost-benefit
96. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See DeMuth, Constrain Regulatory Costs: Part II, The Regulatory Budget, REGULATION,
Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 30-31.
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analysis as the tool by which "excessive and inefficient" regulation might
be controlled, others had long argued that executive oversight by itself
would accomplish little of value.100 They believed that increased oversight
would be nothing but window dressing unless the incentives facing regula-
tors were fundamentally changed. Their solution was to put the regulators
on a "budget," making them balance the costs of regulatory programs
against perceived benefits. Proposals for a regulatory budget, however,
created only a brief stir. Economists debated whether the numbers neces-
sary for such a budget could ever be developed, and the debates themselves
resulted in widespread recognition that a full-blown regulatory budget
was impractical. 0
The 1985 Reagan executive order resurrects the regulatory budget con-
cept in a radically altered form. Those who previously advocated estab-
lishing a regulatory budget had focused on its utility as a technique for
program control. 02 But such a budget can also serve as an instrument for
political control. Budgets are political statements which are manifestations
of a government's priorities." 8 Reagan's new "regulatory budget without
numbers" has the potential of fulfilling this political purpose.
Assembling a workable regulatory budget document will be a formida-
ble undertaking. It remains to be seen whether OMB-and especially
OIRA-is capable of the task. Certainly, institutionalization of regulatory
budgets will require a significantly increased commitment of resources by
OMB. It will also require that the OMB Director have the ability and
desire to understand the scope and content of executive branch regulatory
programs. The position of OMB director must thus evolve from that of a
professional budgeteer to a political professional with a broader, more pol-
icy-oriented perspective.10 4 Preparation of a regulatory budget without
100. Among the most vocal of these economists was Christopher DeMuth, who later became head
of Reagan's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. In a 1980 two-part article in Regulation,
DeMuth first reviewed the history of presidential efforts to control regulation and found them fatally
flawed. He then proposed the idea of the regulatory budget-although he was not the first to do so.
See DeMuth, Constrain Regulatory Costs: Part I, The White House Review Programs, REGULATION,
Jan-Feb. 1980, at 13; DeMuth, supra note 99, at 29.
101. For a summary of the arguments in these debates, see R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, RE-
FORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 133-58 (1983).
102. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 99-100.
103. Presidents in the early part of this century moved to create a unified Executive Branch
budget. Individual agencies had previously submitted their budgets directly to the Congress. The
change has enabled presidents to develop a coherent set of priorities that reflect the aims of their
administrations as well as to exert detailed control over various programs.
104. The current OMB director, David Stockman, fits the latter description. Prior to becoming
head of OMB he had served for two terms as a Republican Congressman from Michigan. In that
capacity he was heavily involved in observing and shaping federal regulatory activity. See, e.g., Stock-
man, Address, in GOVERNMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 393 (D.
Ginsberg & W. Abernathy eds. 1980).
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numbers will shift the agency's focus further away from preparation of a
financial budget and toward a broader executive branch managerial role.
It is unclear how Congress will greet such a change. In a real sense, the
creation of a regulatory budget without numbers represents a greater shift
in power from the Congress to the President than did the consolidation of
oversight power within OMB in 1981. Reagan's 1981 executive order fol-
lowed in the tradition of similar efforts by Reagan's three predecessors to
exercise control over regulations issued by agencies of the executive
branch.'0 5 Only in the order's implementation was there a break from
tradition. In contrast, the 1985 executive order asserts that the President
has the power to take various regulatory programs established by the
Congress and combine them into an "administration regulatory program"
that reflects his priorities."' Where Congressionally-mandated guidelines
do not exist, OMB can set the level and scope of social regulation. Given
the apparent immunity of oversight to legal challenges,' this program
gives the President enormous power to shape the regulatory pro-
cess-provided he is able to appoint regulators who can avoid the legal
pitfalls and congressional problems that hampered the Reagan Adminis-
tration during its first term.'0 8
Congress might react to the introduction of a regulatory budget and the
accompanying shift of power to the executive in many ways. Some com-
mittees have already indicated that they will require agencies over which
they exercise oversight to submit their regulatory agendas to Congress
before they submit them to OMB.'0 9 Presumably, this would enable the
committees to gauge how much OMB alters these agendas in developing
the Administration's annual regulatory program." 0 Congress could also
respond by revising agency authorizing legislation to reduce executive dis-
cretion, as it did in the recent revision of the Resource Conservation and
105. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 45-67.
106. Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 96.
107. See, e.g., Center for Science in the Pub. Interest v. Dep't of Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1168,
1178 (D.D.C. 1983) (Administrative Procedure Act did not require agency to disclose contacts and
information received in informal rulemaking); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (scope of arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of agency).
108. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
109. Agencies under the purview of the House Energy and Commerce Committees will have to
satisfy this requirement. See Broadened Powers Give Budget Office Control Over Rules, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
110. Indeed some legislative movement along these lines may already be perceptible. S. 2433, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(g)(1)(A) (1984), proposing revisions to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44
U.S.C. § 3501-3520 (1982), would have required that the administrators of federal regulatory agen-
cies make publicly available a copy of any draft of a proposed or final rule submitted by an agency for
review to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Vol. 2: 293, 1985
Regulatory Reform
Recovery Act."' 1 Alternatively, it could achieve the same result by impos-
ing tight deadlines and narrow requirements on the scope of permissible
regulations. This would prevent the Administration from developing its
own separate regulatory program by removing the leverage that regulators
in the executive branch have to influence the timing and content of agency
rules and regulations.
Congress itself could attempt to become involved in the regulatory
budgeting process. The role that OMB has come to play in reviewing
regulations is not substantially different from the role it plays in assem-
bling the Administration's financial budget or in "clearing" Administra-
tion testimony and legislation. Secrecy and behind-the-scenes bargaining
characterize all of these processes. Compared to the process of regulatory
review, however, budget review and legislative clearance generate rela-
tively little controversy. This is because the results of these reviews go to
the Congress. If Senators or Representatives do not like the results, they
are in a position to act directly to change them. This is not the case with
regulation. To be sure, Congressional committees can hold oversight hear-
ings or use budget riders to try to control how agencies regulate.' These
avenues of control, however, are less satisfactory methods of expressing
legislative intent than is actual legislation. It is thus not clear how success-
ful Congress could be in exercising control through its own regulatory
budgeting.
Congress' likely response to regulatory budgeting is as yet unclear. We
believe, however, that the simultaneous referral of a draft regulatory
agenda to OMB and to the Congress would probably be an ineffective
technique for Congressional control, as simultaneous submission of inde-
pendent regulatory commission budgets has been. We have no evidence
that this dual review has given Congress any additional leverage in setting
those agencies' budgets. We, however, also believe that it would be ex-
tremely undesirable for Congress itself to start drafting regulations. Con-
gress originally delegated rulemaking. authority to executive agencies be-
cause it recognized that it could not handle the job itself."' Much of the
arbitrariness and inefficiency of regulation results from regulators being
forced to implement highly detailed statutory standards which leave little
room for administrative flexibility. If anything, regulators need more, not
less, discretion. Congress should, therefore, focus on promoting the re-
sponsible use of discretion and not second-guess day-to-day decisions of
111. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, tit. 2, 98 Stat. 3221,
3226-66 (amending the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982)).
112. Until it was declared unconstitutional, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Congress
increasingly resorted to the use of the legislative veto as a means of controlling agency action.
113. See, e.g., R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 74, 425 (1941).
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regulators who seek to fashion coherent regulatory programs. Congress
does have an important role to play in setting the tone of regulatory activi-
ties by taking a comprehensive look at regulatory priorities. Unless such
broad scale reviews are conducted, the Congress will surrender to the ex-
ecutive the power to set regulatory priorities.
D. The Prospects for Legislative Reform
In stark contrast to its attempts to encourage the adoption of market
mechanisms, delegate regulatory authority, and expand executive over-
sight, the Administration's record in pressing for and obtaining legislative
changes has been dismal.114 For a number of reasons, the prospects for
legislative change during the second term are no brighter.
First, the spillover effects of the political controversy which character-
ized the early years of Reagan's regulatory relief program have been most
acutely felt in the legislative arena."" By 1980, bipartisan political sup-
port was beginning to center around revising what have been termed the
"aspirational" provisions of a number of prominent pieces of social legis-
lation." 6 The statutes' aspirational goals were seen as creating institu-
tional tensions among the three branches of government, between agencies
and firms, and between federal and state regulators. The regulatory mis-
adventures of the Administration's early years, however, provided a text-
book lesson on how to stimulate public support for strengthening the na-
114. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs, Christopher DeMuth, then
head of OIRA, stated "[Iln the [first] three years [of the Reagan Administration] we have not ad-
vanced a single detailed proposal of our own for reform of any of the major health, safety, or environ-
mental statutes." C. Demuth, Regulatory Policy 5 (Dec. 9, 1983) (unpublished memorandum on file
with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
115. Murray Weidenbaum's comments in a paper prepared for a June 1983 Urban Institute
Conference provide a fitting assessment of the political climate: "We will be lucky if, by January 1985
we are back where we were in January 1981 in terms of the public's attitude toward statutory reform
and social regulation." Weidenbaum, Regulatory Reform Under the Reagan Administration, in REG-
ULATORY STRATEGY, supra note 54, at 15, 38.
116. The term, coined by Yale Law School Professor Jerry Mashaw, refers to an absolute legisla-
tive approach. See J. Mashaw, Remarks at Urban Institute Conference (June 22-23, 1983). A short
list of these provisions would probably start with the Delaney Clause to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act which bans all food additives "found . . . to induce cancer in man or animal" even if
some putatively safe level for human use could be established. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982). The
clause is, thus, thought to set a no-risk goal for the carcinogenicity of food additives and to prohibit, in
effect, a weighing of costs or an assessment of comparative health risks associated with the ban. See
generally L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 11-
15 (1981).
Another likely candidate for the "short" list of aspirational enactments would be the provisions
setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the 1970 Clean Air Amendments. 40 C.F.R. §
50.1-12 (1984). The 1970 Amendments have been criticized as costly, inefficient, indifferent to loca-
tion, inhibiting modernization, and, paradoxically, increasing the total amount of pollution exposure.
See Harrison & Portney, Remedy for the Clean Air Act, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 27.
Moreover, the Act has been interpreted in a manner which does not permit the balancing of costs
and benefits in designating exposure levels. See id. at 25.
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tion's social legislation. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the
percentage of citizens believing that some relaxation of federal environ-
mental laws would be appropriate was at an eight-year high.11 7 Midway
through the President's first term, the polls showed not only a sharp drop
in the percentage of citizens believing that environmental laws and regula-
tions had gone too far, but also a substantial rise in the percentage of
respondents believing that they had not gone far enough. " 8
Second, legislative change is often politically expensive. If the Reagan
Administration has provided future presidents with a valuable lesson on
achieving their political objectives, it is that success comes from concen-
trating political capital on a narrow and achievable agenda. " 9 Judging
from the Administration's first term, it can be assumed that the President
and his staff will deploy their political capital to control the shape of
budget and tax measures, choosing not to expend such capital on reform
measures for social regulations.
Finally, as we have documented, 20 substantial change in the day-to-day
administration of the regulatory process, in the focus of regulatory author-
ity, and even in the designation of selected regulatory standards can be
accomplished without legislative change. These administrative opportuni-
ties may make the bruising, relatively public process of legislative change
seem unnecessary, if not politically inadvisable.
In sum, the unfavorable political climate for legislative action, its high
political cost, and the opportunities for regulatory change available else-
where indicate that legislative stasis is likely. Indeed, it is clear that regu-
latory relief objectives did not underlie legislative activity in the 98th Con-
gress. While the term ended with a host of major environmental laws
(including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act) remaining to be reauthorized, the one bill which did
pass-the amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ' 21-provided evidence that proposals for regulatory relief have had
little effect on current legislation. The bill not only expanded EPA's regu-
latory responsibilities, 2 ' but also eliminated agency discretion by setting
very specific agency priorities in the processing of permits. 123
117. The group, though, remained small, representing only 23% of those polled. See THE CON-
SERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1982, at 425, fig. 9.11 (1982).
118. Id.
119. See Salamon & Lund, Governance in the Reagan Era-An Overview in THE REAGAN PRES.
IDENCY AND THE GOVERNING OF AMERICA 17-18 (1985).
120. G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 18, at 179-89.
121. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 221, 98 Stat.
3221, 3248-51 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6921) (1984).
122. It required for the first time that generators disposing between 100 and 1000 kilograms of
hazardous waste per month dispose of their waste at a RCRA-approved facility.
123. See, e.g., id. § 201(e) (prohibiting land disposal of solvents and wastes containing dioxin
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Conclusion
After having failed to take advantage of a significant opportunity for
change during its first term, the Reagan Administration has apparently
reconciled itself to spending the next four years on the legislative sidelines
as well. As James C. Miller III, Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, recently said, "The President is just going to let the glue dry on
deregulation."'' If Miller's prognosis is correct, the Administration's reg-
ulatory legacy will be quite different from the one which the President
might have hoped for and expected. In the absence of legislative change,
the Reagan legacy will be broadened administrative discretion and a
greater presidential control over the course of social regulation. While this
might give deregulation-minded presidents like Ronald Reagan an oppor-
tunity to reduce perceived regulatory burdens, it also gives presidents with
differing philosophies the power and the tools they need to turn regulation
to quite different ends.
beginning 24 months after enactment); § 201(d) (banning hazardous wastes on the "California
list"-cyanide, arsenic, lead, mercury, etc.-from land disposal beginning 32 months after enactment);
§ 103(a) (appointing an ombudsman to respond to citizen inquiries regarding RCRA programs); §
202(a) (requiring the promulgation of regulations within 30 months requiring that all new landfills,
surface impoundments, waste piles, underground tanks, and land treatment units use approved leak
detection systems); § 231 (ensuring that 12 months after enactment every hazardous waste treatment,
storage, or disposal facility has a permit and shall be inspected at least every two years).
124. Ronald Reagan's Second-term Agenda, FORTUNE, Oct. 1, 1984, at 26, 30.
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